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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
000O000---

MERLIN DANSIE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vsMURRAY CITY CORPORATION,
A Municipal Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
-—000O00

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF, RESPONDENT
MERLIN DANSIE

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action initiated by Merlin Dansie for an Order
restraining Murray City from enforcing its building height restriction ordinances as concerning a storage shed Plaintiff was constructing on his residential property.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court. Plaintiff!s-Respondentfs
petition of an extraordinary writ was granted.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks denial of Defendantappellants
Appeal.
-1-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Same as set forth in Defendant's-Appellants Brief, except
some vital differences, to-wit:
1. The Garage for which the permit was issued was nearly
and substantially completed except for putting on top coat of
the garage*
2. That the Affidavitsof Mr. Lorin Simper and Mr. Charles
D. Clay were signed, filed and presented to the Court on the
date of trial without the opportunity of the Plaintiff to counter
the Affidavits, or to cross-examine Affiants, having no known
knowledge of the Affidavits prior to submission to the Court.
3. That Defendant-Appellant was informed at the time the
Plaintiff-Respondent issued the building permit, knowledge of
Section 11 of Ordinance No. 4004, but nothing was said of Section
of Ordinance No. 4004.
ARGUMENT
This matter was submitted to the Court, and the facts
submitted. Plaintiff was granted the relief prayed. (T-7) The
Court found in effect that Plaintiff's Petition to be true (T-2 &
that estoppel should apply, and to do so

found sufficient just-

ification to do so. In addition to the foregoing, it is submitted
-2-

that the ordinance the Appellant contends should be rigidly
enforced, Section 15 of Ordinance No.4004, is unreasonable.
Owner A with a one-story high house could not put another
building on his lot higher than the eves of the house, unless
he added a second story to his house, even if the building was
at the back of his lot a half (%) block away, while A's next
door neighbor, who may own a half (%) mile square lot adjacent
to A ! s lot could put a 30 foot high building within yards of
A's house if he built his house 30 feet high, on the opposite
side of his half (%) block square lot. Also, I assume a man
could not, at any time, build a garage or building first, before
building his house because there would be no eves to be compared
to, and what about a basement house?

It is submitted that

limiting the height of buildings to a set heighth to insure

con-

formity of a whole neighborhood makes sense, but limiting the
height of a building such as a garage to the eves of the owner1s
house when the house ia s low-ranch-type house, and allowing the
owner across the street, or next door, to go 30 feet high if the
neighbor can afford to build, or desires to build, a 30 foot high
house is unreasonable.

Limiting all building, including all

houses to 30 feet high might make sense to control a neighbor-hood,
but to restrict a man from building his garage to the eves of
-3-

his

15-foot high house, and to let his next door neighbor

build to 30 feet high, if he builds a higher house, is unreasonable.

Especially when the 30-foot high garage, could possibly

be built closer to the low-house than the high-house^ depending
upon the size of the lots and the location of the houses thereon,
CONCLUSIONS
The order of the District Court should be confirmed*
CT FULLY SUBMITTED

Jeorg^
Attorney for'Respondent,
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